CONFIDENTIAL! 

FOR  OFFICIAL   USE  ONLY 


NOTES 

ON  THE 

METHODS  OF  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE 

TO  MEET  THE  CONDITIONS  OF 

MODERN  WARFARE 


COMPILED  AT  THE 

ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE 

FROM  THE  LATEST  AVAILABLE  INFORMATION 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
1917 


CONFIDENTIAL! 

FOR  OFFICIAL  USE  ONLY 


NOTES 

ON  THE 

METHODS  OF  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE 

TO  MEET  THE  CONDITIONS  OF 

MODERN  WARFARE 


COMPILED  AT  THE 

ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE 

FROM  THE  LATEST  AVAILABLE  INFORMATION 


APRIL;  1917 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
1917 


WAR  DEPABTMENT. 

Document  No.  585. 

Office  of  The  Adjutant  General. 

(2* 


WAR  DEPARTMENT, 

WASHINGTON,  May  9,  1917. 

The  following  notes  on  the  methods  of  attack  and  defense  to 
meet  the  conditions  of  modern  warfare  are  published  for  the 
information  and  guidance  of  all  concerned. 
[2595445,  A.  G.  O.] 

BY  OKDEB  OF  THE  SECRETARY  OF  WAR: 

H.  L.  SCOTT, 

Major  General,  Chief  of  Staff. 
OFFICIAL  : 

H.  P.  McCAIN, 

The  Adjutant  General. 
(3) 


THE  METHODS  OF  ATTACK  AND  DEFENSE  TO  MEET 
THE  CONDITIONS  OF  MODERN  WARFARE. 


INTRODUCTION. 

MANEUVER  WARFARE. 

Early  in  the  European  war  there  were  operations  of  ma- 
neuver on  both  the  east  and  west  fronts,  but  as  the  contest 
developed  and  the  first  drives  on  wide  fronts  were  finally 
brought  to  a  halt,  due  to  the  near  equality  of  the  opposing 
forces,  making  it  impossible  for  the  offensive  to  make  a  further 
move  to  the  front,  each  side  began  to  "  dig  in "  in  order  to 
strengthen  the  defensive  and  prevent  loss.  This  operation  was 
kept  up  on  both  sides,  and  as  the  opposing  forces  tried  to  turn 
each  other's  flanks  and  brought  forward  other  forces  to  pre- 
vent their  own  flanks  being  turned,  the  lines  were  extended 
and  joined  with  other  parts  of  the  line  similarly  developed 
until  the  entire  forces  on  either  side  formed  one  almost  con- 
tinuous line  of  entrenched  positions  extending  across  the  whole 
front,  with  flanks  resting  on  impassable  obstacles  or  on  neu- 
tral territory. 

Owing  to  the  fact  that  there  has  been  comparatively  little 
maneuver  warfare,  which  has  been  confined  mainly  to  the  east- 
ern front,  its  principles  of  attack  and  defense  have  undergone 
very  little  change.  There  are  a  few  things,  however,  that 
deserve  mention. 

Artillery. — The  use  of  Artillery,  especially  heavy  Artillery, 
has  been  greatly  increased  in  maneuver  (as  well  as  trench) 
warfare,  thus  requiring  deployment  at  greater  distances  and 
greatly,  reducing  the  value  of  existing  permanent  fortifica- 
tions, and  consequently  compelling  the  construction  of  deep 
trenches  and  underground  shelters  in  fieldworks  for  protec- 
tion against  the  destructive  fire  of  the  heayy  guns. 

Aircraft. — The  extensive  use  of  aeroplanes  and  dirigible  and 
captive  balloons  has  also  been  an  important  development  of 
the  present  war,  and  they  have  been  very  valuable,  especially 

(5) 


6 

in  strategical  reconnaissance,  but  also  in  tactical  reconnais- 
sance in  conjunction  with  the  Cavalry  and  in  directing  the 
fire  of  Artillery.  Every  movement  of  troops  is  seen  and  re- 
ported by  aeroplane  observers,  so  that  the  element  of  surprise 
due  to  the  rapid  movement  of  troops  in  the  theater  of  opera- 
tions has  been  eliminated,  except  in  the  case  of  movements  at 
night  or  in  rainy  or  foggy  weather. 

Motor  transport. — One  of  the  most  interesting  and  important 
,  innovations  has  been  the  use  of  motor  transport  for  the  move- 
ment of  large  bodies  of  Infantry  from  one  theater  to  another  to 
be  thrown  in  at  critical  points.  Undoubtedly  the  resort  to  such 
means  contributed  largely,  even  vitally,  to  the  success  of  the 
French  in  the  battle  of  the  Marne. 

TRENCH  WARFARE. 

4 

When,  after  indecisive  maneuvers,  both  belligerents  settled 
down  in  entrenched  positions  facing  each  other  there  was 
initiated  a  system  of  trench  warfare  different  from  anything 
heretofore  known.  It  has  since  been  continued  and  developed 
to  a  remarkable  extent,  until  at  present  the  position  of  each 
belligerent  consists  of  two  or  three  and  even  four  entrenched 
zones,  the  trenches  of  each  being  very  complicated  in  design 
and  constructed  with  great  care  and  at  an  enormous  cost  of 
labor  and  material. 

The  methods  of  attack  and  defense  (of  these  entrenched  po- 
sitions) as  adopted  at  different  times  have  changed  with  the 
progress  of  operations  and  the  development  of  various  new 
kinds  of  offensive  and  defensive  weapons ;  new  methods  of 
attack  and  defense  have  been  adopted  only  to  be  abandoned 
upon  the  appearance  of  some  new  weapon  or  some  change  in 
the  method  of  use  of  an  old  weapon. 

Frontal  attacks. — Owing  to  the  fact  that  the  lines  rest  their 
flanks  on  impassible  obstacles  or  on  neutral  territory  wide  turn- 
ing movements  are  not  possible,  and  enveloping  movements  HI  im- 
possible only  in  local  attacks  against  small  portions  of  the 
hostile  line  after  it  has  been  pierced,  so  that  all  main  attacks 
are  confined  to  purely  frontal  attacks. 

Obstacles. — The  use  of  obstacles,  both  natural  and  artificial, 
has  greatly  increased,  one  of  the  most  important  being  wire 
entanglements,  which  are  used  extensively  on  all  fronts. 

Liaison. — One  of  the  most  important  improvements  developed 
in  the  present  war  has  been  that  in  communication  between, 


and  cooperation  and  coordination  of,  the  different  elements  of 
a  command ;  this  is  covered  by  the  French  term  "  liaison." 

This  feature  is  referred  to  in  all  reports  from  the  various 
fronts. 

The  aeroplane  cooperates  with  the  Artillery,  not  only  in  locat- 
ing the  enemy  but  in  directing  the  fire  upon  him,  and  also  with 
the  Infantry,  giving  constant  information  of  the  dispositions 
and  movements  of  the  enemy. 

Cavalry. — Cavalry  is  no  longer  used  in  large  bodies  for 
mounted  action ;  the  increased  number  of  lines  of  trenches,  the 
great  increase  in  the  use  of  artillery  and  machine  guns,  together 
with  the  use  of  barbed  wire  in  almost  unlimited  quantity,  ren- 
ders the  opportunities  for  the  use  of  Cavalry  comparatively 
few. 

It  was  used  in  Belgium  in  earlier  stages  of  the  war,  but  since 
trench  warfare  began  it  has  generally  been  dismounted  and 
horses  held  in  rear  while  the  men  are  equipped  as  Infantry  and 
put  into  the  trenches. 

Artillery. — In  trench  warfare  the  Artillery  cooperates  more 
closely  than  ever  with  the  Infantry,  Artillery  reconnaissance 
officers  and  scouts  accompanying  the  most  advanced  Infantry 
lines  in  order  to  obtain  information  about  targets  for  the  Artil- 
lery, even  going  forward  with  the  assaulting  lines  so  as  to  keep 
their  batteries  informed  of  the  exact  location  of  the  Infantry 
and  of  any  new  targets  presenting  themselves.  There  is  a  cer- 
tain number  of  these  Artillery  observers  or  scouts  attached  to 
each  battalion  of  Infantry. 

They  carry  back  the  information  obtained  to  protected  Artil- 
lery observing  stations,  from  which  it  is  telephoned  (usually  by 
a  buried  wire)  to  the  observing  station  of  the  Artillery  com- 
mander. 

This  system  of  information,  of  course,  causes  considerable 
losses  in  the  Artillery,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  of  very 
great  assistance  to  the  Infantry,  and  prevents  enormous  losses 
from  their  ranks. 

Other  developments  which  have  greatly  affected  the  methods 
of  attack  and  defense  are :  The  great  increase  and  importance 
of  machine  guns  and  automatic  rifles,  the  introduction  of  aerial 
torpedoes,  trench  cannon,  armored  tanks,  rifle  grenades,  the 
reversion  to  the  ancient  system  of  bombs  and  hand  grenades, 
and  the  use  of  gas. 


8 
THE  ATTACK. 

Artillery. — The  general  method  of  attack  used  almost  exclu- 
sivi-ly  at  present  in  Europe  is  to  smother  the  defense  with  u 
torrent  of  explosive  shells,  kept  up  incessantly  for  from  one 
to  three  or  more  days,  so  shattering  the  defense  that  they  will 
be  able  to  offer  but  slight  resistance  to  the  advance  of  the 
Infantry;  then  to  rush  forward  with  the  Infantry  and  seize 
the  enemy's  positions  while  his  forces  are  still  demoralized 
and  consolidate  them  before  reenforcements  can  be  brought  up 
through  the  Artillery  barrage  for  a  counterattack. 

This  Artillery  bombardment  is  absolutely  necessary  to  pre- 
pare the  way  for  the  Infantry  advance,  as  otherwise  the 
Infantry  could  not  advance  in  the  face  of  the  hostile  artillery, 
rifle,  and  machine-gun  fire. 

This  bombardment  has  for  its  object: 

(a)  To  destroy  or  silence  the  hostile  artillery. 

(&)  To  destroy  or  cut  passages  through  the  wire  entangle- 
ments in  front  of  the  enemy's  position. 

(c)  To  destroy  the  hostile  Infantry  trenches,  especially  the 
supporting  points,  or  cause  their  defenders  to  abandon  them. 

(d)  To  seek  out  and  destroy  the  hostile  machine  guns. 

(e)  To  produce  curtains  of  fire  or  barrage  covering  the  ad- 
vance of  the  Infantry. 

(/)  To  prevent  the  bringing  up  of  hostile  reenforcements. 

Notwithstanding  the  close  cooperation  mentioned  above  be- 
tween the  Artillery  and  Infantry,  once  the  Infantry  has  moved 
out  of  their  front  trenches  the  connection  is  to  a  certain  extent 
impaired,  and,  in  fact,  the  wire  communication  may  often  be 
broken,  so  that  there  might  be  too  much  delay  in  getting  word 
back  to  the  Artillery  commander  to  enable  him  to  open  effec- 
tive fire  on  suddenly  discovered  objectives,  such  as  machine- 
gun  emplacements,  concrete  dugouts,  or  hostile  detachments 
exposing  themselves  for  a  brief  period.  To  provide  against 
such  a  condition  light  guns — 37  millimeters — are  assigned  to 
the  Infantry  regiments,  one  to  each  battalion,  subject  only  to 
the  orders  of  the  regimental  and  battalion  commanders  con- 
cerned. 

They  are  light  enough  to  be  moved  by  hand  and  can  follow 
by  fire  or  change  of  position  any  advance  of  the  Infantry. 
This  gun  is  easily  adjusted,  very  accurate  and  effective  up  to 


1,500  yards.  Its  shell  can  penetrate  two  or  three  thicknesses 
of  sand  bags  or  a  plate  of  steel  and  then  explode,  its  explosive 
effect  being  about  the  same  as  a  grenade. 

Save  under  exceptional  cases  it  is  always  attached  to  the 
machine-gun  company  for  the  attack. 

It  is  primarily  a  weapon  for  the  offensive,  and  its  essential 
r61e  is  to  destroy  with  direct  fire  the  visible  machine  guns,  but 
it  is  also  very  effective  against  troops  taken  under  enfilade 
fire. 

They  are  employed  separately  and  not  grouped  in  batteries. 
Since  they  make  good  targets,  they  wait  till  the  last  few 
minutes  preceding  the  assault  to  destroy  the  machine  guns 
which  the  Artillery  may  not  have  reached. 

This  use  of  a  small-caliber  gun  with  the  Infantry  is  not 
favored  by  the  British.  They,  however,  use  a  gun  of  about 
equal  caliber  in  their  tanks,  which  is  very  effective  against 
machine  guns. 

Infantry. — The  Infantry,  in  trench  warfare,  is  divided  into 
two  classes — holding  troops  and  attacking  or  shock  troops. 

The  mental  and  physical  strain  on  troops  in  the  trenches 
under  conditions  of  modern  warfare  is  so  terrible  that  after 
being  subjected  to  it  for  any  length  of  time  they  are  not  con- 
sidered fit  for  an  energetic  assault,  and  this  duty  is  assigned 
to  other  troops  called  shock  troops,  which  consist  of  picked 
organizations  recruited  from  the  youngest  and  most  vigorous 
men  in  regions  which  have  produced  the  best  fighting  stock. 
Shock  troops  are  rarely  sent  into  the  trenches  for  routine  duty, 
but  when  not  actively  engaged  in  conducting  or  resisting  an 
attack  are  kept  in  camps  or  cantonments  well  behind  the  battle 
front,  where  they  can  have  good  rest  at  night  while  training 
hard  every  day.  In  this  way  mobility,  cohesion,  and  enthu- 
siasm are  preserved  in  this  most  important  class  of  troops. 

The  holding  troops  are  those  kept  in  the  trenches,  and  being 
under  almost  constant  fire  and  subject  to  attack  in  their 
trenches,  it  becomes  necessary  to  change  them  frequently  and 
give  them  a  period  of  rest  behind  the  lines  for  recuperation. 
Two  weeks  in  the  trenches  and  two  weeks  in  rear  is  the  usual 
division  of  time. 

Auxiliaries. — The    auxiliaries    of   the    Infantry    are    so    im- 
portant   and   so   intimately    associated    with    it   in    the    attack 
that   mention   of   some   of   them    will   be   made   before   going 
into  the  details  of  the  attack. 
98451° — 17 2 


10 

(a)  The  use  of  machine  guns  has  greatly  increased  since 
(he  European  war  began.  The  Lewis  and  other  guns  of  that 
type  ai'e  classed  usually  as  automatic  weapons  and  consti- 
tute part  of  the  equipment  of  each  Infantry  company,  while 
the  heavier  guns,  such  as  the  Maxim,  the  Colt,  and  Vickers, 
into  the  details  of  the  attack. 

The  French  have  a  machine-gun  company  of  eight  guns  be- 
longing to  each  battalion  of  Infantry. 

The  British  have  16  guns  to  a  machine-gun  company  and 
three  or  four  of  these  companies  form  a  battalion  which  consti- 
tutes the  machine  guns  of  a  division,  and  the  guns  are  assigned 
wherever  needed. 

The  Germans  have  probably  a  larger  proportion  of  machine 
guns  than  either  the  British  or  French,  and  they  make  very 
extensive  use  of  them  in  all  phases  of  the  attack  and  defense. 

The  use  of  machine  guns  forms  the  subject  of  a  separate 
paper  and  the  details  of  their  use  are  omitted. 

GRENADES. 

The  extensive  use  of  grenades  has  been  revived  in  the  present 
war  after  having  been  abandoned  for  100  years  or  more.  With 
the  adoption  of  trench  warfare  it  was  discovered  that  while  the 
fire  of  the  modern  high-powered  rifle  is  of  little  value  in  as- 
saulting strong  trenches,  the  fire  of  grenades  is  very  effective, 
so  much  so  that  the  grenade  is  now  considered  a  necessary 
auxiliary  of  the  rifle,  and  forms  part  of  the  equipment  of  every 
Infantry  regiment. 

Indeed  the  grenade  now  plays  almost  as  important  a  part  in 
trench  warfare  as  the  rifle. 

All  Infantry  units  are  instructed  in  grenade  throwing  or 
bombing  and  the  specialists  of  this  class  are  generally  in  the 
advance  wave  of  the  attack. 

The  trench  mortar,  another  resurrection  of  an  ancient  weapon, 
has  come  into  general  use  in  trench  warfare  to  supplement  the 
work  of  the  Artillery.  It  fires  a  shell  up  to  a  foot  in  diameter 
or  a  cylinder  of  shells  with  a  range  of  more  than  400  yards.  It 
is  fairly  accurate  and  very  effective  against  both  personnel  and 
mate'riel. 

THE  ORGANIZATION  OF  FRENCH  INFANTRY. 

A  French  regiment  is  composed  of  three  battalions,  each  con- 
sisting of  three  companies  of  Infantry  and  a  machine-gun  com- 
pany of  eight  guns,  with  one  37-mm.  gun  attached.  Each  com- 


11 

pany  has  eight  automatic  rifles  in  addition  to  its  other  equip- 
ment. 

The  battalion  has  thus  come  to  be  a  very  strong  unit,  capable 
of  progressing  by  its  own  means,  and  of  breaking  most  of  the 
resistance  it  encounters. 

The  company  is  divided  into  four  identical  sections,  and  each 
section  into  two  half  sections  of  two  squads  each,  as  follows : 

First  half  section,  under  command  of  a  bomber-sergeant,  or 
automatic  rifleman  (fusilier)  sergeant. 

First  squad   (bombers)  : 
1  corporal. 

7  bombers. 

Second  squad   (fusiliers)  : 

1  corporal. 

6  fusiliers   (2  automatics,  with  teams  of  three). 
Second  half  section,  under  command  of  a  rifleman  sergeant. 
Third  squad   (riflemen)  : 

1  corporal. 

8  riflemen. 

2  rifle-grenade  men. 
1  grenade  carrier. 

Fourth  squad   (riflemen)  : 

1  corporal. 

9  riflemen. 

2  rifle-grenade  men. 
1  grenade  carrier. 

This  would  make,  in  the  four  sections : 

4  sergeants,  automatic  riflemen  or  bombers. 

4  corporals,  automatic  riflemen  or  bombe*s. 
24  automatic  riflemen. 

4  sergeants,  riflemen. 

8  corporals,  riflemen. 
68  riflemen. 

4  corporals,  bombers. 
28  bombers. 
16  rifle-grenade  men. 

8  grenade  carriers. 


Total 168 

A  company  has  altogether  194  men. 

The  other  soldiers  of  the  section  not  fighting  in  the  ranks, 
such  as  the  drummer  or  bugler,  pioneer,  cyclist,  signaler,  orderly, 


12 

hospital-corps  man,  etc.,  are  divided  among  the  squads  to  equal- 
ize their  strength. 

This  organization  gives  the  advantage  of  permitting  the  intro- 
duction of  the  new  arms  into  the  Infantry  without  upsetting  the 
organic  channels  of  command  as  they  are  now  established.  The 
c-iptnin  commands  the  sections. 

An  important  point  to  note  is  that  all  specialist  groups  are 
officered,  allowing  a  company  or  battalion  commander  to  con- 
centrate them  if  the  particular  tactical  situation  requires  it. 
They  play  the  normal  part  in  combat  if  they  do  not  receive 
special  instructions. 

Every  man  must  know  how  to  throw  a  grenade,  and  every 
rifleman  is  taught  a  particular  specialty  so  as  to  be  able  to  re- 
place, in  case  of  an  emergency,  any  specialist  who  happens  to 
be  put  out  of  action.  From  a  tactical  point  of  view,  the  char- 
acteristics of  the  new  armament  bring  about  a  thinning  of  the 
firing  line,  thereby  increasing  the  depth  of  the  formations. 

Both  in  offense  and  defense  the  machine  guns  and  the  37- 
mm.  guns  are  a  necessary  complement  to  the  other  armament 
of  the  Infantry.  These  in  conjunction  with  the  automatic 
rifles  and  rifle  grenades  compel  the  enemy  to  remain  hidden  in 
liis  holes  and  trenches,  while  the  bayonet  men,  trench  cleaners, 
and  bombers  are  rushing  forward  to  engage  in  hand-to-hand 
fighting.  The  machine  guns,  automatic  rifles,  and  37-mm.  guns, 
having  a  flat  trajectory,  sweep  down  any  objective  emerging 
from  the  ground.  The  hand  and  rifle  grenades,  having  a  high 
trajectory,  can  reach  the  trenches  and  any  objective  under- 
ground, then  the  work  of  all  these  is  completed  by  the  bayonet 
men  and  trench  cleaners. 

ATTACK   OF   A  DEFENSIVE  POSITION. 

In  an  attack  it  should  be  emphasized  that  the  unity  of  com- 
mand in  depth  must  be  preserved  everywhere  unless  there  is  an 
imperative  reason  for  doing  otherwise. 

The  principle  must  govern  in  the  regiment  and  if  possible  in 
the  battalion,  thus:  If  two  or  three  regiments  are  to  be  as- 
signed to  as  many  waves,  each  regiment  must  receive  its  proper 
proportion  of  the  front,  and  the  front  of  each  regiment  should 
also  be  divided  between  the  two  or  three  battalions. 

Thus  each  battalion  commander,  having  to  look  after  a  front 
of  about  500  to  600  yards,  can  exercise  efficient  control  of  his 


13 

command,  and  the  colonel,  by  placing  himself  in  the  center  of  a 
zone  800  or  1,000  yards  wide,  can  be  kept  well  informed  of 
the  progress  of  his  battalions  and  will  be  able  to  direct  their 
movements. 

If  deployed  over  much  greater  fronts  and  the  reenforcements 
come  from  different  organizations,  the  homogeneity  in  depth 
would  be  entirely  lost  and  field  officers  would  lose  control  over 
such  an  extended  front. 

Moreover,  as  the  attack  progresses,  the  mixing  of  different 
units  would  be  very  objectionable,  owing  to  the  difficulty  of 
assigning  new  and  different  targets  to  the  many  heterogeneous 
groups  thus  formed  from  the  various  organizations. 

In  any  case  success  is  impossible  unless  the  ground  has  been 
thoroughly  prepared,  and  this  takes  a  long  time. 

In  preparing  for  an  assault,  seniors  must  take  steps  to  organ- 
ize it  and  make  all  necessary  preparations  themselves  and  not 
leave  all  responsibility  with  the  juniors,  as  this  would  prob- 
ably mean  isolated  advances  by  small  bodies  and  resultant  con- 
fusion and  disaster. 

The  hostile  terrain  must  be  studied  with  the  utmost  care  by 
direct  observation,  by  patrols,  and  by  the  aid  of  aerial  photo- 
graphs. 

In  the  assault  each  unit  must  know  its  special  task  before- 
hand, and  if  possible  the  entire  movement  should  be  rehearsed 
in  rear  of  the  lines  in  trenches  laid  out  to  correspond  to  those 
of  the  enemy.  Each  commander  must  know  the  exact  time 
he  is  to  start  and  must  not  fail  to  start  on  time.  To  insure 
all  starting  at  same  time,  all  watches  are  carefully  synchronized 
beforehand. 

The  hosile  defensive  works  generally  consist  of  two  or  more 
intrenched  zones,  each  composed  of  two  or  more  lines  of  trenches 
with  supporting  points  or  strong  points  constructed  at  villages, 
woods,  and  other  suitable  places,  so  arranged  as  to  furnish 
flank  fire  on  the  ground  in  front  and  in  the  intervals. 

At  the  present  time  the  more  and  more  extended  use  of  the 
counter  battery  has  permitted  sending  of  men  forward  in  much 
thinner  lines  than  formerly,  which  are  of  course  much  less 
vulnerable,  consequently  the  almost  general  rule  of  forming 
the  first  waves  of  men  placed  at  4  or  5  paces  interval. 

A  chief  of  section  can  command  only  a  front  of  80  to  100 
paces,  and  the  section  consisting  of  about  40  men,  it  is  necessary 
to  form  the  section  in  two  lines  or  waves,  the  first  wave  con- 


14 

sisting  usually  of  the  grenadiers  and  the  automatic  riflemen, 
the  latter  in  the  center,  and  the  second  wave  of  the  riflemen 
and  the  rifle  grenadiers,  the  latter  in  the  center. 

The  section  is  thus  capable  of  becoming  completely  i-ngagt-d 
in  case  it  should  come  in  contact  immediately  with  the  enemy, 
since  the  rifle  grenadiers  are  placed  at  sufficient  working  dis- 
tance to  the  rear  of  the  first  wave,  and  the  automatic  riflemen 
can  instantly  reach  any  enemy  in  movement  oa  the  open  ground. 

If  the  terrain  is  cut  up  by  woods,  villages,  etc.,  the  proportion 
of  grenadiers  may  be  increased  by  taking  them  from  the  sections 
in  support  and  the  automatic  riflemen  sent  back  to  the  second 
wave. 

Or  if  the  distance  to  cross  between  departure  trench  and  the 
enemy  exceeds  300  or  400  yards,  the  number  of  automatic 
riflemen  would  be  increased. 

Two  or  three  sections  are  usually  placed  abreast  on  the  com- 
pany front,  which  thus  covers  200  or  300  yards. 

The  support  sections  follow  the  leading  sections  of  their 
company  at  about  50  yards,  marching  in  two  lines,  or,  where 
possible,  in  two  lines  of  squad  columns  at  20  yard  interval, 
with  a  few  yards  distance  between  the  lines  (practically  a  line 
of  half  sections  in  column  of  files). 

In  the  latter  formation  they  may  be  maneuvered  to  a  certain 
extent  toward  important  points,  such  as  the  intervals  where 
the  first  wave  has  already  broken  through  and  advanced  toward 
the  support  of  the  trenches  of  the  enemy. 

The  first  wave  or  line  of  the  support  is  usually  formed  of  the 
half  section  of  specialists,  for  the  reason  that  in  case  of  en- 
countering a  difficulty  which  calls  for  reenfcrcements  it  is 
usually  the  specialists  who  will  be  needed  and  called  upon 
first. 

The  echeloning  of  the  specialists  in  front  is  also  the  most 
favorable  formation  to  progress  by  rushes  in  a  terrain  cut  up 
by  shell  holes ;  the  half  section  of  specialists  is  sufficiently 
armed  to  clear  out  the  shell  holes  or  resist  temporarily  a  hostile 
counter  attack. 

The  chief  of  section  is  ordinarily  between  the  two  waves  of 
his  section. 

The  captain  is  usually  in  front  of  the  support  sections. 

The  support  sections  are  closely  followed  by  a  powerful  line 
of  machine  guns,  which  are  thrown  into  the  fight  where  needed 
to  reenforce  the  leading  units  and  organize  new  assaults  or  to 


15 

open  fire  on  any  new  targets  offered  by  advancing  hostile 
troops. 

The  machine  guns  are  directed  on  selected  points  which  are 
offering  obstinate  resistance  to  the  attacking  lines,  especially 
the  hostile  machine  guns. 

If  an  attack  is  made  in  the  form  of  an  assault  certain  frac- 
tions detailed  to  clean  up  the  enemy  trenches,  called  "  trench 
cleaners,"  usually  march  immediately  behind  the  leading  sec- 
tions and  may  be  taken  from  the  support  sections.  They  are 
armed  with  pistols,  knives,  and  hand  grenades. 

If  the  attack  takes  the  form  of  a  gradual  progression  the 
echeloning  of  the  sections  is  made  according  to  the  same  prin- 
ciple, but  the  special  details  of  trench  cleaners  is  unnecessary, 
as  the  trenches  are  cleaned  up  by  the  same  troops  that  took 
possession  of  them. 

The  captain  can  use  his  sections  complete,  or,  since  the 
specialists  have  been  specially  trained,  he  can  take  them  out  of 
their  sections  and  use  them  for  a  particular  purpose  and  some- 
times with  much  greater  results. 

The  soldier  specialists,  such  as  the  grenadiers,  automatic 
riflemen,  ammunition  carriers,  rifle  grenadiers,  and  trench 
cleaners,  carry  only  tl.c  weapons  or  munitions  of  their  specialty, 
and  otherwise  have  their  loads  lightened. 

The  ordinary  riflemen  carry  the  usual  pack  and  equipment. 

The  officers  no  longer  lead  the  assault,  but  direct  it.  They 
wear  no  distinguishing  insignia  and  are  equipped  with  the  rifle 
and  bayonet,  the  same  as  the  enlisted  men.  Each  unit  of  the 
first  wave  of  attack  is  given  a  definite  objective.  At  the  sig- 
nal for  the  assault  the  waves  rush  forward  at  short  distances 
from  each  other  so  as  to  cross  in  a  very  brief  space  of  time  the 
zone  of  barrier  fire  of  the  enemy,  but  the  different  waves  must 
not  break  upon  the  first  wave,  for  that  would  only  increase 
the  density  of  the  skirmish  line  and  increase  the  losses. 

Fire  is  opened  by  the  assaulting  troops  only  at  short  ranges, 
the  advance  being  protected  by  a  curtain  of  Artillery  fire. 

As  the  leading  wave  approaches  the  enemy's  first  line  of 
trenches  to  within  throwing  distance,  grenade  fighting  begins 
and  is  kept  up  until  the  trenches  and  approaches  are  cleared 
of  the  enemy. 

The  advancing  lines  make  use  of  shell  holes  or  any  depres- 
sion or  other  place  offering  any  concealment  or  protection  in 
the  advance  to  the  assault  or  from  trench  to  trench. 


16 

This  must  be  done  step  by  step  and  with  great  caution,  in 
order  to  minimize  losses  caused  by  enemy's  grenades  and  by 
traps,  fougasses,  etc. 

Genades  are  thrown  ahead  so  as  to  gradually  clear  the  ap- 
proaches, and  when  a  lateral  trench  is  reached  several  grenades 
are  thrown  in  each  direction — right  and  left. 

The  grenadiers  are  assisted  by  the  automatic  riflemen,  who 
fire  on  any  of  the  enemy  attempting  to  advance  along  the  ap- 
proaches, and  when  the  enemy  is  overwhelmed  they  move  for- 
ward and  clear  the  way  for  the  further  advance  of  the  grena- 
diers, who  in  turn  bombard  the  next  section  of  the  approaches 
with  grenades. 

When  the  first  wave  reaches  the  objective  it  is  joined  by  the 
half  section  of  riflemen,  who  immediately  organize  the  cap- 
tured ground  and  prepare  to  defend  it  stubbornly  against 
counterattack. 

Wneri  no  further  advance  is  possible,  sandbag  barricades  are 
built  at  the  point  of  furthest  advance  and  preparation  made 
for  another  assault. 

The  main  efforts  are  directed  against  the  intervals  between 
the  supporting  or  strong  points.  No  attempt  is  made  to  storm 
these  points  for  to  do  so  would  entail  t->>  great  losses,  but  cer- 
tain units  are  given  the  task  of  encircling  them  by  occupying 
their  flanks  or  borders  to  prevent  their  bringing  an  enfilade 
fire  on  the  troops  assaulting  along  the  intervals.  If  the  attack 
on  the  intervals  succeed,  the  supporting  or  strong  points  will 
fall  of  themselves. 

THE   BRITISH   DIVISION   ATTACKING   FROM 
TRENCHES. 

BECONNAISSANt  K. 

The  division  commander  is  assigned  his  frontage,  objective, 
and  assembly  area,  and  is  informed  of  the  Artillery  support  he 
may  expect  and  of  the  action  of  the  divisions  on  his  flanks. 

Before  he  can  formulate  his  plans  for  attack  there  must  be 
a  thorough  reconnaissance  of  the  enemy's  trenches  and  the 
ground  over  which  the  attack  is  to  be  made.  The  aeroplane 
reconnaissance  and  photographs  must  be  supplemented  by  per- 
sonal observation  and  patroling. 

When  brigade  and  battalion  commanders  are  assigned  their 
tasks  they  must  also  reconnoiter  their  fronts. 


17 

ARTILLERY. 

The  Artillery  preparation  lies  to  a  certain  extent  outside 
the  province  of  the  division  commander,  as  the  Artillery  plan, 
except  for  minor  operations,  is  coordinated  by  the  Artillery 
commander  under  the  orders  of  the  corps  commander,  after 
consultation  with  the  division  commanders  concerned.  The 
division  commanders  study  the  plan  so  far  as  it  affects  their 
tasks  and  make  such  recommendations  as  they  think  necessary. 

The  commanders  of  brigades  and  battalions,  with  the  com- 
mander of  the  Artillery  detailed  to  support  them,  study  on  the 
ground  the  Artillery  plan  so  far  as  it  affects  them. 

In  regard  to  the  use  of  the  Artillery  for  barrage  purposes  two 
batteries  of  a  battalion  are  assigned  to  a  front  of  about  250 
yards,  this  front  being  divided  about  equally  between  them.  The 
third  battery  is  assigned  to  cover  the  whole  front  of  the  other  two 
batteries.  The  advantage  of  this  arrangement  is  that  the  third 
battery  may  be  switched  to  some  special  objective  off  the  main 
front  without  stopping  entirely  the  fire  on  any  part  of  the  front. 
A  jumping  rather  than  a  creeping  barrage  is  generally  used 
in  order  to  jump  from  one  hostile  trench  to  the  next,  unless  it 
becomes  necessary  to  search  thoroughly  all  shell  holes  and 
other  hiding  places  in  between  the  principal  lines  of  the  enemy 
trenches. 

Immediately  after  the  advance  of  the  Infantry  begins  the 
light  Artillery  supporting  it  commences  an  intense  bombard- 
ment with  the  object  of  forcing  the  enemy  to  take  cover,  and 
thereby  prevent  him  manning  his  defenses  before  the  In- 
fantry reach  the  trench. 

At  the  moment  laid  down  in  the  time  table  of  Artillery  fire 
the  barrage  lifts  clear  of  the  trench  and  the  Infantry  rush  in 
and  capture  it. 

The  Infantry  must  therefore  be  taught  that  success  depends 
on  their  getting  within  about  75  yards  (depending  on  the  range) 
of  the  barrage  before  it  lifts,  in  order  that  they  may  reach 
the  trenches  before  the  enemy  can  man  them,  and  this  requires 
only  a  few  seconds. 

The  secret  of  a  successful  assault  rests  upon  the  assumption 
that   the   Infantry    conform   their   movements   exactly   to   the 
timing    of    the    barrage.     Therefore    the    importance    of    th:s 
timing  can  not  be  overestimated. 
98451°— 17 3 


18 

The  pace  of  a  barrage  depends,  to  a  certain  extent,  on  the 
pace  of  the  Infantry,  which  varies  with  the  conditions  of  the 
ground,  the  length  of  the  advance,  the  number  of  enemy 
trenches  to  be  crossed,  etc.  It  may  be  from  75  to  15  yards  per 
minute. 

The  pace  of  the  barrage  should  be  quicker  at  first  and  grad- 
ually slow  down  as  the  men  become  exhausted,  in  order  to  give 
them  time  to  get  close  up  to  the  barrage,  and  pull  themselves 
together  for  the  final  rush. 

SIGNALS  FROM  THE  INFANTRY  TO  THE  ARTILLERY. 

For  the  first  hour  or  so  after  the  assault,  until  the  communi- 
cations can  be  well  established,  touch  between  the  Infantry 
and  the  supporting  Artillery  will  generally  be  restricted  to 
calls  for  barrage  fire  by  means  of  light  signal  rockets,  and 
leading  troops  should  have  an  ample  supply  of  these. 

Colored  flags,  carried  by  one  or  two  men  in  each  platoon, 
are  waved  to  indicate  line  gained  by  the  leading  Infantry. 
They  must  not  be  stuck  in  the  ground.  Signals  from  the 
aeroplanes  will  be  referred  to  later. 

INFANTRY  ORGANIZATION. 

The  British  have  abandoned  the  regimental  organization,  and 
a  brigade  now  consists  of  4  battalions,  and  a  division  of  3 
brigades,  or  12  battalions. 

An  administrative  staff  and  transport  are  assigned  to  bat- 
talions. 

The  machine  guns  of  a  division  are  organized  into  3 
companies  of  16  guns  each.  They  are  being  increased  to  4  com- 
panies of  16  guns  each  to  a  division. 

The  Infantry  company  of  250  men  is  divided  into  4  platoons, 
each  of  4  sections. 

They  count  on  an  effective  strength  of  about  160  men  to  the 
company,  or  40  to  the  platoon.  The  organization  of  the  sec- 
tions is  different  and  each  has  its  particular  task. 

The  first  section  is  composed  of  bombers  and  rifle  grenade 
men. 

The  second  and  third  sections  are  composed  of  riflemen  with 
bayonets. 

The  fourth  section  is  composed  of  seven  Lewis  gunners,  with 
one  Lewis  gun. 


19 

The  Lewis  guns  form  part  of  the  regular  equipment  of  the  In- 
fantry companies  and  are  not  a  part  of  the  machine-gun  com- 
pany. 

FORMATION  AND  FRONTAGES. 

In  an  attack  each  unit  must  have  sufficient  driving  power  in 
itself  to  carry  it  through  to  its  objective  and  maintain  itself 
when  it  gets  there. 

When  a  number  of  trenches  have  to  be  carried,  considerable 
depth  will  be  required  to  the  formation  in  order  to  give  the 
necessary  driving  power,  and  the  frontage  must  be  reduced. 

If  in  later  attacks  there  should  be  only  one  or  two  lines  of 
trenches  as  the  objective,  the  frontage  may  be  increased. 

A  brigade  usually  has  a  front  of  attack  of  about  500  to  700 
yards,  but  this  may  be  increased  to  1,000  or  1,200  where  the 
resistance  is  much  less. 

A  battalion  should  have  a  frontage  of  from  250  to  350  yards. 

The  battalion  must  be  organized  in  depth  in  a  series  of  waves. 
Two  companies  are  usually  put  abreast  in  the  first  line,  and  the 
others  in  the  second  line. 

Each  company  in  both  lines  attacks  in  column  of  platoons  at 
about  50  yards  distance  with  intervals  of  3  to  5  paces 
between  men,  so  there  would  be  eight  lines  or  waves,  of  two 
platoons  each. 

The  eighth  and  sixteenth  platoons,  the  two  in  rear  forming 
the  eighth  wave,  are  usually  not  employed  in  the  attack,  but 
are  left  behind  as  a  nucleus  to  form  on  in  case  of  heavy 
casualties. 

ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  TRENCHES  FOR  THE  ATTACK. 

FRONT    TRENCHES. 

The  front  line  or  parallel  of  departure  must  be  not  less  than 
200  yards  from  the  enemy's  front  line,  and  as  nearly  as  possible 
parallel  to  that  line,  so  as  to  insure  the  leading  waves  jumping 
off  squarely  toward  their  objective. 

ASSEMBLY    TRENCHES. 

The  leading  two  or  three  waves  are  more  likely  to  meet 
machine-gun  fire,  and  generally  move  in  extended  order,  as 
they  should  present  as  unfavorable  a  target  as  possible.  For 


20 

this  reason  continuous  trenches  parallel  to  the  parallel  of  de- 
parture are  necessary.  Not  more  than  two  waves  can  be 
accommodated  in  one  trench. 

The  subsequent  waves  will  move  in  line  or  in  line  of  section 
columns  in  single  file,  and  for  these  small  tees  or  sidings  off 
the  approach  trenches  most  easily  provide  cover.  Reserves 
can  usually  be  accommodated  in  the  trenches  of  the  reserve 
or  intermediate  lines  without  much  additional  labor. 

APPROACH    TRENCHES. 

There  should  be  separate  trenches  for  moving  forward  or  to 
the  rear,  and  these  are  called  "  in "  and  "  out "  trenches, 
which  are  plainly  marked  as  such. 

There  should  be  one  of  each  on  each  battalion  front  of  attack 
to  within  800  yards  of  the  front  line,  and  a  separate  one  of 
each  on  each  brigade  front  of  attack  up  to  the  same  point. 

In  addition  there  should  be  one  of  each  on  each  company 
front  of  attack  for  the  depth  of  the  company  zone  of  assembly. 

"  Out "  trenches  must  have  corners  rounded  so  as  to  allow 
passage  of  stretchers. 

A  map  showing  "  in  "  and  "  out  "  trenches  must  be  made  and 
issued  down  to  company  commanders.  Where  time  does  not 
permit  digging  necessary  trenches,  some  will  have  to  be  used 
as  both  "  in  "  and  "  out "  trenches,  and  provision  made  for  pass- 
ing by  widening  trench  or  digging  sidings  every  25  yards  long 
enough  to  admit  stretchers.  Detailed  police  are  placed  on  duty 
to  regulate  the  traffic. 

SAPS. 

Russian  saps  must  be  run  out  as  far  as  possible  across  "  No 
man's  land  "  to  be  opened  up  immediately  after  the  assault,  as 
approach  trenches,  or  for  use  previous  to  the  assault  for  in- 
stalling boring  machines,  trench  mortars,  machine  guns,  etc. 

EXITS  FROM   TRENCHES. 

For  the  leading  waves  which  move  in  line,  and  must  there- 
fore leave  the  trenches  simultaneously,  ladders  or  steps  are 
necessary.  If  ladders  are  used,  all  those  in  one  bay  should  be 
fastened  together  at  top  and  bottom  to  prevent  falling,  and  none 
should  project  above  the  parapet. 


21 

For  the  subsequent  waves,  when  moving  in  column,  short 
zigzag  saps  run  out  from  the  trench  and  terminating  in  a 
ramp,  form  the  most  convenient  exit. 

Provision  must  be  made  for  bridges  over  the  first  line 
trenches  for  the  rear  waves. 

FOBMATION  OF  THE  WAVES. 

In  the  original  assault  where  machine-gun  fire  is  likely  to 
be  more  trouble  than  the  enemy  barrage,  lines  will  be  more  suit- 
able for  both  leading  and  rear  waves,  but  in  the  later  stages 
of  the  attack  when  the  enemy's  barrage  is  the  dominating  fac- 
tor, it  is  better  for  the  rear  waves  to  move  in  small  handy 
columns,  which  are  easier  to  maneuver  and  can  pick  their  way 
through  the  enemy  barrage  with  fewer  casualties. 

In  the  original  assault  the  distance  between  waves  may  be  75 
to  100  yards,  in  order  to  minimize  the  casualties  from  machine- 
gun  fire.  In  later  stages  as  many  waves  as  possible  must  be 
started  before  the  hostile  barrage  comes  down,  and  they  may 
follow  each  other  at  50  yards  or  even  less. 

It  is  not  possible  to  lay  down  for  use  on  all  occasions  a 
definite  signal  for  the  Infantry  to  leave  their  trenches  and  to 
commence  the  assault. 

In  the  original  attack  where  the  enemy's  barrage  is  not  likely 
to  be  heavy,  zero,  or  the  initial  time  for  the  assault  to  begin, 
may  be  fixed  for  the  moment  at  which  our  barrage  lifts  from 
the  enemy  front  trench,  the  Infantry  timing  their  advance  so 
as  to  be  close  under  our  barrage  before  it  lifts. 

In  the  later  stages,  when  the  enemy,  being  on  the  alert,  may 
be  expected  to  put  down  a  heavy  barrage  very  quickly,  it  is 
essential  that  the  Infantry  all  start  together.  Zero  then  must 
be  the  moment  at  which  our  barrage  commences,  and  this  com- 
mencement will  be  the  signal  for  the  Infantry  to  leave  their 
trenches. 

THE  ASSAULT. 

Each  wave  is  assigned  its  own  objective.  Great  care  is  given 
to  the  synchronization  of  all  watches  in  order  that  all  units 
may  start  off  at  its  exact  appointed  time. 

The  first  wave  is  composed  of  bombers  and  rifle  grenade  men, 
and  attack  the  enemy's  first-line  trenches.  It  must  go  straight 
through  to  its  objective,  following  the  Artillery  barrage  as 


22 

closely  as  possible.  Intervening  hostile  trenches  must  be 
crossed  as  quickly  as  possible,  the  line  reformed  oil  the  other 
side,  and  the  advance  resumed. 

The  second  and  third  waves,  composed  of  riflemen  with 
bayonets  and  Lewis  guns,  reenforce  the  first  wave  after  the 
latter  have  occupied  the  enemy's  first-line  trench  and  attack 
the  enemy's  second-line  trench. 

The  fourth  wave  takes  up  tools,  ammunition,  and  sandbags 
and  assists  in  consolidating  the  lines. 

The  fifth  wave  is  a  mopping-up  party  to  clear  the  enemy's 
dugouts. 

The  sixth  wave  comprises  battalion  headquarters,  and  has 
two  Lewis  guns,  kept  for  a  special  purpose. 

The  seventh  and  eighth  waves,  if  used,  seize  and  consolidate 
the  enemy's  third-line  trench. 

Bombing  squads  (one  N.  C.  O.  and  8  men)  are  on  the  flank 
of  each  attacking  wave.  The  battalion  bombers  are  assigned 
a  special  task. 

All  movement  must  be  over  the  top  of  the  ground.  The  pace 
throughout  should  be  a  steady  walk,  except  for  the  last  30  or 
40  yards  before  reaching  each  trench,  when  the  line  should 
break  into  a  steady  double  time,  finishing  up  the  last  10  yards 
with  a  rush. 

The  men  of  the  mopping-up  parties  must  be  trained  with 
great  care  under  selected  officers,  as  it  is  very  important  that 
every  man  should  know  exactly  what  to  do. 

They  should  always  wear  a  distinguishing  mark.  Sometimes 
each  wave  has  its  own  mopping  party,  or  separate  parties  may 
be  assigned  to  each  of  several  waves. 

On  arrival  at  their  allotted  trench  they  must  at  once  dispose 
of  any  occupants  who  may  have  emerged  from  their  dugouts, 
and  picket  the  dugout  entrances  to  prevent  any  more  coming 
out,  then  clean  them  out  with  grenades,  while  other  parties 
are  sent  to  clear  the  approach  trenches  forward  as  far  as  the 
next  line  trench. 

The  ultimate  unit  in  the  assault  is  the  platoon.  The  platoon 
must  be  organized  and  trained  as  a  self-contained  unit,  capable 
of  producing  the  required  proportion  of  riflemen,  bombers, 
rifle  bombers,  Lewis  gunners,  carriers,  and  runners  trained 
to  work  in  combination.  On  the  skill  of  the  platoon  leader 
and  the  teamwork  of  the  different  small  parties  trained  to 
their  particular  tasks  under  their  own  leaders,  the  success  of 
the  assault  will  largely  depend. 


23 

When  conditions  are  favorable—  that  is,  when  there  is  plenty 
of  dugout  accommodations  available — assaulting  troops  should 
take  over  their  parallel  of  departure  in  sufficient  time  to  give 
them  12  hours  of  daylight  in  the  trenches  before  the  assault. 
This  gives  time  to  get  acquainted  with  the  ground  over  which 
they  have  to  assault  and  enables  the  men  to  get  some  rest 
before  the  assault. 

Arrangements  must  be  made  to  give  all  ranks  a  hot  meal, 
including  hot  tea  or  coffee,  before  the  assault. 

Every  precaution  must  be  taken  to  prevent  the  enemy  realiz- 
ing that  the  assault  is  about  to  take  place.  Bayonets  must 
not  be  allowed  to  show  over  the  parapet  or  in  communication 
trenches.  There  must  be  no  increase  in  the  rate  of  the  artil- 
lery fire,  and  no  unusual  or  sudden  movement  in  the  trenches. 
The  enemy  must  be  kept  in  the  dark  until  the  barrage  com- 
mences ;  otherwise  he  will  put  down  his  own  barrage  and 
possibly  prevent  our  attack  from  leaving  our  own  trenches. 

CONSOLIDATION. 

When  a  trench  has  been  carried  it  becomes  necessary  to  con- 
solidate it,  to  provide  against  a  counter  attack. 

OUTPOST. 

In  order  to  protect  this  consolidation  the  first  thing  is  to  throw 
out  a  covering  force  or  outpost  line  formed  of  small  self-contained 
posts  of  about  one  noncommissioned  officer  and  six  riflemen  with 
a  Lewis  gun,  about  150  or  200  yards  apart  and  100  or  200  yards 
beyond  the  line. 

These  posts  establish  themselves  in  some  convenient  shell 
hole,  which  is  converted  as  rapidly  as  possible  into  a  short  length 
of  fire  trench,  and  wire  entanglements  constructed  as  soon  as 
possible. 

Approach  trenches  running  toward  the  enemy  must  be  blocked 
and  hand  and  rifle  grenadiers  posted  to  guard  them. 

MAIN  LINE. 

The  main  captured  treich  must  be  converted  at  once  into 
a  fire  trench  facing  the  enemy.  If  the  trench  is  badly  knocked 
to  pieces,  it  may  be  better  to  consolidate  an  entirely  new  trench 
40  or  50  yards  in  front  of  the  captured  line. 


24 

Existing  dugouts  are  cleared  out,  entrances  opened  up,  and 
traverses  built  to  protect  them.  Old  approach  trenches  to  front 
and  rear  are  cleared  out  or  new  ones  dug. 

In  the  latter  case  small  bombproof s  for  two  men  each  should 
be  constructed  where  material  is  not  available  for  larger  ones. 

REORGANIZATION. 

If  too  many  men  are  left  in  the  captured  trench  they  can  not 
all  get  cover  from  hostile  shelling,  and  the  commander  must 
reorganize  his  unit  in  depth  to  provide  supports  and  reserves 
for  counter  attacks. 

STRONG   POINTS. 

To  give  additional  depth  to  the  defense  the  engineers  construct 
small  posts  or  strong  points,  designed  for  garrisons  of  about  20 
rifles  and  one  or  two  machine  guns,  located  200  or  300  yards  in 
rear  of  the  consolidated  line,  and  as  soon  as  they  are  ready  they 
are  occupied  by  garrisons  detailed  beforehand. 

SIGNAL  COMMUNICATIONS. 

(a)  Cooperation  with  contact  aeroplanes. — Contact  patrol 
work  by  aeroplane  is  designed  to  keep  all  headquarters 
informed  as  to  the  progress  of  the  troops  during  the  attack, 
to  report  the  movements  of  the  enemy,  and  to  transmit  mes- 
sages from  the  troops  to  the  headquarters  of  their  organ- 
izations. 

Aeroplanes  for  this  work  should  have  special  markings  which 
are  known  to  all  ranks  of  the  Infantry.  They  will  carry 
Klaxon  horns  and  Very's  lights  for  the  purpose  of  making 
themselves  known  and  answering  signals  from  the  ground. 

Infantry  may  expect  to  see  their  contact  patrol  vertically 
over  our  own  and  the  enemy  trenches. 

Attacking  Infantry  signal  to  aeroplanes  by  means  of  flares 
lit  by  previous  arrangement,  either  at  specified  places  or,  pref- 
erably, at  specified  times. 

At  the  hour  fixed  the  Infantry  on  the  most  advanced  line 
keep  on  the  lookout  for  signals  and  light  their  flares  when  their 
aeroplanes  call  for  them  by  Klaxon. 

Flares  can  be  seen  if  lit  in  bottom  of  trenches  or  in  shell 
holes  if  care  be  taken  that  there  are  no  obstructions. 


Battalion  and  brigade  headquarters  indicate  positions  and 
identity  by  ground-signal  sheets  and  strips,  and  send  messages 
by  ground-signal  panels  and  by  lamp. 

Headquarters  will  indicate  that  they  have  a  message  for  an 
aeroplane  by  displaying  the  white  side  of  panel  or  shine  their 
lights  on  the  aeroplane. 

When  the  aeroplane  is  ready  to  receive  a  message,  it  will 
send  the  call  letters  of  the  headquarters  concerned,  either  by 
Klaxon  or  by  lamp. 

Wireless  will  be  used  by  contact  patrol  aeroplanes  ordinarily 
only  for  the  purpose  of  sending  down  targets  for  the  Artillery. 

Contact  patrol  aeroplanes  may  be  employed  on  special  recon- 
naissance before  and  during  an  attack  to  report  the  enemy's 
dispositions  and  his  defenses,  and  the  result  of  our  Artillery 
bombardment. 

Commanders  giving  orders  for  such  reconnaissance  should 
fully  consider  the  risks  run  by  pilots  in  carrying  them  out.  At 
1,500  feet  elevation  or  less  an  aeroplane  is  almost  certain  to 
be  hit  by  rifle  or  machine-gun  fire  from  the  ground,  unless  the 
enemy  is  fully  occupied  in  fighting. 

At  a  height  of  3,000  feet  an  attack  can  be  followed  by  an 
aeroplane,  damage  to  trenches  by  bombardment  can  be  reported 
upon,  and  railroad  tracks  can  be  seen. 

At  2,500  feet  men  massed  in  trenches  can  be  seen. 

At  2,000  feet  wire  (in  good  light)  and  overhead  traverses 
can  be  seen. 

At  1,500  feet  dugout  entrances  can  be  seen,  and  men  making 
signals,  such  as  waving  helmets. 

At  1,000  feet  our  troops  can  be  distinguished  from  those  of 
the  enemy. 

(&)  Cable. — The  rapid  establishment  of  good  signal  communi- 
cations after  the  assault  is  most  important  and  very  dif- 
ficult, and  no  possible  means  should  be  neglected. 

The  most  valuable  form  is  via  cable  lines  for  telegraph  and 
telephone,  and  these  should  be  laid  as  soon  as  possible.  To 
make  them  secure  requires  burying  to  a  depth  of  6  feet  or 
more. 

Approach  trenches  not  required  for  consolidation  may  pre- 
viously be  selected  as  cable  trenches  and  the  cables  buried 
in  these,  as  that  would  take  less  time  than  digging  new  ones, 
and  there  will  usually  be  dugouts  that  can  be  used  for  test 
points. 


2G 

C.-ihles  are  run  out  immediately  behind  the  last  wave  of  the 
assaulting  column  and  carried  through  to  the  trench  that  <s 
being  consolidated. 

(c)  Visual. — Good  results  can  be  obtained  from  visual  signal- 
Ing   when   the   topography   of   the   ground    is   suitable.     Back 
stations  in  our  own  lines  are  specially  prepared  and  provided 
with  overhead  cover. 

Points  where  it  is  proposed  to  establish  stations  in  the 
enemy's  lines  are  approximately  located.  Enemy  machine-gun 
emplacements  are  often  valuable  for  such  purposes. 

The  details  for  these  are  sent  forward  after  the  objective 
has  been  gained. 

Before  these  are  completed,  communication  from  the  assault- 
ing companies  to  the  rear  companies  is  kept  up  by  the  company 
signalers. 

(d)  Pigeons. — These   are  very  valuable  when   properly   or- 
ganized  and    used.     They    are   kept   back    at   battalion    head- 
quarters and  sent  forward  when  the  position  is  gained.     They 
are  kept  in  dugouts,  which  should  be  as  dry  as  possible,  and 
are  reserved  for  important  messages. 

(e)  Wireless. — Wireless    is    reserved    for    urgent    messages, 
such  as  calls  for  barrage  fire,  and  messages  sent  should  be 
very  short  and  concise. 

Wireless  sets  are  sent  forward  from  brigade  headquarters 
to  selected  battalion  headquarters  as  soon  as  the  position  is 
gained. 

They  must  be  placed  in  a  reasonably  dry  dugout  which  is 
reserved  for  wireless  only. 

(/)  Earth  induction  sets. — When  these  are  used  battalion 
signalers,  specially  trained  in  the  use  of  the  buzzer,  are  sent 
forward  to  the  captured  position  to  send  messages  back. 

(g)  Runners. — These  can  be  relied  upon  when  all  other 
means  fail,  and  should  be  specially  trained.  There  are  usually 
10  to  each  battalion  headquarters  and  4  to  each  company  head- 
quarters; each  platoon  commander  also  has  one.  They  usually 
go  forward  with  their  commanders. 

They  wear  a  distinctive  mark  and  should  know  all  the  routes 
to  all  the  principal  centers  in  their  battalion  sectors  and  to  their 
own  and  all  forward  dumps,  and  to  headquarters  of  the  brigade 
and  of  the  battalions  on  the  flanks. 


27 

SITUATION   REPORTS. 

The  importance  of  keeping  superiors  informed  of  the  situation 
at  the  front  is  very  great  and  situation  reports  should  be  sent 
in  fiequently. 

It  is  often  better  and  quicker  to  send  a  rough  sketch  instead  of 
a  message. 

Situation  reports  must  be  supplemented  by  reconnaissance  and 
reports  of  staff  officers,  and  these  are  usually  the  quickest  and 
surest  way  of  obtaining  information  when  communications  break 
down. 

TANKS. 

Tanks  as  at  present  developed  must  be  considered  as  entirely 
accessory  to  the  ordinary  methods  of  attack ;  that  is,  the  assault 
by  Infantry  in  close  cooperation  with  the  Artillery. 

Any  modification  of  the  plan  of  attack  when  they  are  used 
must  be  such  as  will  not  jeopardize  the  success  of  the  original 
plan  of  attack  in  case  of  failure  by  the  tanks. 

If  possible,  they  should  reach  the  enemy  trench  just  ahead 
of  the  infantry,  but  not  more  than  about  50  yards  ahead,  other- 
wise they  would  run  into  our  barrage.  Owing  to  their  noise 
they  can  not  be  gotten  nearer  than  about  400  yards  of  the  enemy 
line  without  risk  of  discovery. 

They  can  not  get  over  ground  very  fast ;  15  to  30  yards  per 
minute  over  ordinary  ground  cut  up  by  shell  fire  and  90  per 
minute  over  good  ground. 

When  the  tanks  start  from  their  rendezvous  400  yards  or 
more  in  rear  at  the  same  time  as  the  Infantry  start  to  the 
assault  they  can  not  catch  up  with  the  Infantry  before  the  latter 
reach  the  enemy  trenches,  but  they  follow  the  Infantry  as  closely 
as  they  can,  ready  to  deal  with  any  strong  points — machine 
guns  or  wire — that  may  be  holding  up  the  Infantry. 

They  are  generally  employed  by  sections  of  four.  They  can 
cross  any  wire  entanglement  and  leave  a  track  passable  by 
Infantry,  but  leaving  strands  of  wire  on  the  ground. 

They  can  push  their  way  through  brushwood  and  over  ordi- 
nary trenches. 

Pigeons  have  been  used  with  success  from  tanks. 


SMOKE  BOMBS. 

The  discharge  of  gas  juid  smoke  or  smoke  alone  is  regarded 
hy  the  enemy  as  a  prelude  to  the  assault,  and  usually  draws 
his  barrage  on  the  trenches  from  which  the  discharges  arc 
issuing. 

This  may  be  taken  advantage  of  to  determine  the  general 
line  of  the  enemy  barrage,  so  that  arrangements  can  be  made 
to  avoid  casualties  later  when  the  real  assault  takes  place. 

If  smoke  is  used  just  before  the  assault  to  conceal  the  ad- 
vance, it  may  cause  the  assaulting  troops  to  lose  the  way  and 
bring  down  the  enemy  barrage  prematurely,  but  it  may  be  use- 
fully employed  over  those  portions  of  the  front  from  which 
no  assault  is  taking  place. 

Smoke  bombs  may  be  used  during  the  advance  to  blind  any 
machine  guns  likely  to  cause  trouble,  especially  on  the  flanks, 
and  to  conceal  the  advance  of  the  reserves. 

MACHINE    GUNS. 

Machine  guns  may  be  used  in  the  attack  to  provide  covering 
fire  for  the  attacking  Infantry,  to  cover  the  withdrawal  of  the 
Infantry  in  case  the  attack  fails,  to  fill  up  gaps  in  the  assault- 
ing line,  to  assist  in  consolidation  of  position  won,  and  to  repel 
counterattacks. 

Direct  fire  should  be  used  where  possible,  but  excellent  re- 
sults can  be  obtained  by  indirect  fire,  provided  careful  arrange- 
ments have  been  made  beforehand. 

LEWIS  GUNS. 

Before  the  assault  Lewis  guns  are  of  great  value  in  knocking 
out  hostile  machine  guns.  A  few  guns  are  pushed  out  into 
"  no  man's  land  "  under  cover  of  darkness  or  fog  and  estab- 
lished in  shell  holes.  When  the  attack  begins  they  open  fire 
on  enemy  machine  guns  or  assist  in  keeping  enemy  Infantry 
down  until  their  fire  is  masked  by  the  advancing  Infantry, 
and  then  remain  under  cover  till  the  Infantry  have  captured 
the  front  line  before  following  the  assaulting  column. 

If  the  attack  goes  through  without  a  check,  Lewis  guns  are 
not  required  with  the  leading  waves,  but  should  be  kept  close 
at  hand  to  deal  with  any  hostile  machine  guns,  and  they 
usually  move  on  the  flanks  of  the  second  wave  of  assault. 


29 

They  may  be  used  also  to  fill  up  gaps  in  the  line  during  the 
assault. 

After  the  assault  they  may  be  used  for  the  outpost  line,  to 
back  up  patrols,  and  to  garrison  the  line  being  consolidated. 

Only  two  men  are  required  to  work  a  Lewis  gun  and  the 
other  trained  gunners  are  kept  back  where  they  can  get  cover, 
and  ammunition  is  carried  forward  by  men  specially  detailed. 

WIRING. 

As  soon  as  the  consolidation  begins,  if  men  are  available, 
wiring  should  be  begun,  especially  of  the  strong  points,  which 
must  be  wired  all  around  as  promptly  as  possible. 

Experience  abroad  has  shown  the  importance  of  the  use  of 
wire  entanglements,  not  only  in  the  defensive,  but  also  as  an 
adjunct  of  the  offensive. 

Even  a  single  strand  of  wire  in  front  of  a  consolidated  line 
is  often  of  great  value  in  resisting  a  counter  attack.  On  the 
other  hand,  wire  and  pickets  are  bulky  and  require  a  large 
carrying  party ;  also  the  presence  of  wire  entanglements  assists 
the  enemy  in  locating  the  exact  trenches  we  are  holding.  The 
erection  of  wire  in  front  of  the  captured  line  during  the  early 
stages  of  the  consolidation  depends,  primarily,  on  whether 
men  are  available  for  the  necessary  carrying  parties. 

In  any  case  the  strong  points  must  be  wired  all  around  simul- 
taneously with  their  construction,  even  if  the  wiring  of  the 
front  line  has  to  wait  till  a  later  period.  It  is  usually  best 
to  detail  a  special  wiring  party,  the  men  carrying  up  their 
own  materials. 

One  of  the  simplest  and  quickest  forms  of  wire  entanglements 
is  the  double-apron  entanglement.  It  consists  of  wire  loosely 
attached  to  wooden  posts,  or  better,  specially  made  iron  posts, 
about  5  feet  long,  driven  or  screwed  into  the  ground  to  a 
depth  of  1J  or  2  feet,  in  rows  6  feet  apart  and  posts  6  feet 
apart  in  rows.  The  depth  should  be  as  great  as  possible,  and 
at  least  30  feet,  the  rear  edge  being  about  20  yards  from  the 
trench. 

The  trace  should  be  irregular,  and  the  best  unit  of  entangle- 
ment is  about  40  or  50  yards  in  length.  Small  zigzag  gaps 
should  be  left  between  each  unit. 

Side  stays  are  usually  desirable,  and  back  stays  are  essential 
to  resist  any  attempt  to  pull  entanglements  away  by  grapnells. 

A  party  of  one  noncommissioned  officer  and  12  men  is  assigned 
to  construct  a  unit  50  yards  long. 


30 
FURTHER  STAGES   OF   CONSOLIDATION. 

Intermediate  posts  are  interpolated  between  the  posts  in  the 
outpost  line  and  flanks  extended  to  form  a  continuous  line. 
They  are  then  linked  up  with  main  line  behind  with  approach 
trenches,  and  this  line  then  becomes  the  starting  point  for  the 
next  assault. 

The  main  line  is  improved,  wired,  and  provided  with  deep 
bombproof  shelters. 

Approach  trenches  are  widened  and  improved.  The  strong 
points  are  strengthened  and  the  necessary  reserves  of  ammuni- 
tion, food,  water,  and  other  supplies  are  stored  in  bombproof s. 

The  strong  points  are  linked  together  by  fire  trenches,  if  time 
permits,  and  the  intervals  between  strong  points  are  filled  in 
with  wire  entanglements. 

The  engineers  are  largely  used  in  consolidating  positions  and 
establishing  dumps  of  ammunition  and  supplies. 

EXPLOITING  THE  SUCCESS. 

A  commander  must  make  every  effort  to  secure  the  objective 
against  recapture,  but  must  not  adopt  a  purely  defensive  atti- 
tude; on  the  contrary,  he  must  continue  the  offensive  with  any 
men  available. 

This  exploiting  of  the  success  is  carried  out  by  means  of 
small  patrols  working  quickly  forward  beyond  our  outpost  line, 
backed  up  by  other  parties  with  Lewis  guns.  The  patrols  con- 
sist of  about  six  men  moving  in  arrowhead  formation,  and  must 
act  with  great  dash  and  boldness. 

The  barrage  is  usually  kept  up  about  20  or  30  minutes  after 
the  objective  has  been  reached,  though  its  intensity  is  con- 
stantly growing  less.  These  patrols  work  up  close  to  the  bar- 
rage and  move  forward  when  it  ceases  or  dash  through  it  as  it 
becomes  less  intense. 

It  is  best  usually  to  decide  beforehand,  if  possible,  approxi- 
mately the  localities  for  which  the  patrols  intend  to  make,  and 
arrange  for  the  barrage  to  be  extended  after  a  certain  hour  to 
include  them. 

These  patrols,  backed  by  the  Lewis  gun  parties,  form  a  new 
line,  which  is  then  consolidated  and  becomes  the  main  battle 
front,  outpost  being  put  out  as  before. 


31 

RESERVES. 

All  commanders  clown  to  and  including  company  commanders 
must  keep  some  portion  of  their  command  in  hand  as  a  reserve. 

From  the  moment  the  assault  starts  there  must  be  a  steady 
flow  of  troops  forward  through  the  division,  stopping  at  certain 
prearranged  lines  where  orders  can  be  sent. 

The  company  commander  needs  a  reserve  to  work  around 
points  holding  up  the  leading  lines,  to  protect  the  flanks  in  case 
the  companies  on  the  right  and  left  are  held  up,  thus  assisting 
those  companies  as  well,  and  to  exploit  his  success  and  gain 
ground  to  the  front.  He  must  keep  it  well  in  hand  behind  the 
company. 

The  battalion  reserve  must  start  with  the  assaulting  column 
and  get  across  "  No  man's  land  "  as  soon  as  possible,  but  must 
not  push  ahead  too  far  and  get  mixed  up  with  the  fighting  and 
thus  get  out  of  hand.  It  is  usually  checked  in  the  vicinity  of 
the  enemy  front  line  trench,  where  it  can  be  kept  under  the 
control  of  the  battalion  commander  and  thrown  in  to  assist  the 
advance  or  extending  a  flank  in  case  the  battalion  on  the  right 
or  left  fails  to  get  forward. 

The  brigade  reserve  must  be  kept  well  in  hand,  usually  just 
clear  of  our  front  line  and  support  trenches,  since  in  addition 
to  the  duties  of  the  other  reserves  it  will  probably  have  to  take 
a  second  objective  after  the  leading  battalions  have  taken  the 
first. 

The  division  reserve  may  be  required  to  capture  a  further 
objective,  passing  through  the  troops  that  have  already  reached 
their  objective;  or  to  relieve  assaulting  origades  which  have 
failed  to  capture  their  objective,  or  which,  owing  to  heavy 
losses,  are  not  able  to  hold  the  captured  line  against  counter 
attacks ;  or  to  form  a  defensive  flank  in  case  of  failure  of  di- 
visions on  the  flanks. 

The  reserves  of  companies  and  battalions  must  start  moving 
over  the  top  of  the  ground  with  the  rest  of  the  assaulting 
troops. 

Those  of  the  brigades  and  division  can  be  moved  to  their 
positions  either  above  ground  or  through  trenches  in  accord- 
ance with  the  amount  of  cover  available. 

No  opportunity  must  be  lost  of  gaining  ground  before  the 
enemy  has  time  to  recover  and  reorganize. 


32 

DEFENSE. 

8.  The  latest  methods  of  defense  consist  in  constructing  sup- 
porting and  strong  points  at  the  most  favorable  points  along 
.the  line  to  be  held,  such  as  villages,  woods,  etc.,  separated  by 
intervals  not  too  great  for  mutual  support,  and  of  such  resist- 
ing power  that  they  must  be  taken  before  the  attack  can  pro- 
gress. 

In  the  intervals  between  these  supporting  and  strong  points 
firing  and  communication  trenches  are  constructed,  but  are  only 
lightly  held.  In  some  cases  dummy  trenches  are  constructed 
in  these  intervals,  which,  to  aeroplane  observers,  and  even  to 
hostile  troops  on  the  ground,  have  the  appearance  of  real 
trenches. 

The  lines  of  the  various  works  are  so  traced  as  to  bring  a 
cross  or  enfilade  fire  on  the  troops  attacking  adjacent  positions. 

The  lines  may  not  be  continuously  occupied,  but  obstacles 
usually  extend  in  an  unbroken  line  along  the  whole  front.  In 
front  of  important  positions  a  wire  entaglement  is  used  in 
belts  20  feet  wide  in  two  or  three  rows,  placed  at  least  20  yards 
apart.  The  general  rule  is  to  construct  all  the  obstacles  pos- 
sible, always  leaving  the  way  clear  for  an  advance  through 
them. 

Each  supporting  point  is  usually  occupied  by  a  battalion, 
and  consists  of  a  series  of  trenches  formed  into  strong  points, 
each  for  a  garrison  of  one  or  more  platoons  or  a  company, 
and  complete  in  itself  for  defense,  surrounded  by  barbed-wire 
entanglements.  These  supporting  points  are  from  600  to  800 
yards  in  depth  and  have  a  front  of  from  600  to  1,000  yards. 
The  first  line  of  strong  points  is  occupied  by  one  or  two  com- 
panies in  firing  and  cover  trenches,  while  the  remainder  of  the 
battalion  occupies  the  support  and  reserve  trenches,  which  are 
also  formed  into  strong  points. 

Communicating  and  cover  trenches  are  constructed  in  rear  of 
the  firing  trenches  and  approach  trenches  connect  the  firing, 
cover,  support,  and  reserve  trenches.  These  trenches  are  pro- 
vided with  a  firing  parapet  throughout  a  large  portion  of  their 
length.  Bomb  proofs  are  built  along  the  cover  trenches  and 
are  connected  with  the  tiring  trenches.  The  approach  trenches 
are  protected  on  both  flanks  by  wire  entanglements. 

The  strong  points  in  the  support  and  reserve  trenches  are 
each  prepared  for  ;ui  iill-around  defense  and  divided  into  two 
or  more  separate  strong  points  by  wire  entanglements. 


33 

The  object  of  a  body  of  Infantry  attacked  is  to  oppose  to  the 
assailant  its  high-powered  weapons,  machine  guns,  automatic 
machine  rifles,  rifle  grenades,  and  hand  grenades,  and  to  reserve 
for  the  counterattack  the  groups  best  adapted  for  close  combat, 
i.  e.,  grenadiers  and  riflemen. 

In  general,  there  is  always  one  line  upon  which  the  resistance 
must  be  made  with  the  greatest  energy.  For  the  defense  of  this 
line  the  following  methods  have  been  used  with  success : 

The  most  formidable  arm  which  the  Infantry  on  the  defensive 
has  available  is  the  machine  gun  acting  by  flank  fire.  The 
Lewis  guns  and  other  automatic  rifles  are  also  valuable  for 
flanking  fire  in  the  defense,  but  are  inferior  to  the  machine 
guns. 

It  may  be  stated  as  a  rule,  however,  that  every  machine  gun 
put  out  of  action  must  be  replaced  immediately  by  an  automatic 
rifle. 

The  front  of  the  battalion  will  be  all  the  more  extended  ac- 
cording to  the  possibility  of  obtaining  flanking  fire  for  the  ma- 
chine guns. 

Machine  guns  play  an  important  part  in  the  defense  of  a  posi- 
tion. 

In  order  that  the  machine-gun  barrage  fire  may  successfully 
play  its  role  at  the  moment  of  assault,  it  is  indispensable  that 
the  machine  guns  survive  the  bombardment. 

Their  protection  is  secured  by  the  following  precautions : 

(a)  Place  the  machine  guns  under  shelter  during  the  bom- 
bardment. 

(&)Make  the  emplacements  for  their  use  as  nearly  invisible 
as  possible. 

(c)  Echelon  the  machine  guns  in  depth  as  far  as  practicable. 

The  emplacements  for  machine  guns  may  be  constructed  out- 
side the  shelters,  but  close  in,  so  that  the  guns  can  be  brought 
under  shelter  and  then  quickly  returned  when  the  bombard- 
ment has  ceased. 

They  may  be  placed  in  the  parapet  with  or  without  overhead 
cover  or  may  be  simply  holes  in  the  ground  in  the  open  with- 
out protection  or  with  a  slight  glacis  in  front. 

Machine  guns  are  generally  placed  in  reentrants  of  the  firing 
trenches  where  they  can  sweep  the  ground  in  front  of  the  wire 
entanglements  and  cover  the  intervals  between  the  adjoining 
supporting  and  strong  points. 


34 

Where  the  ground  will  permit,  they  are  often  placed  in  con- 
cealed positions  20  to  30  yards  in  front  of  the  trenches  to  break 
up  an  attack  made  by  the  hostile  Infantry  while  the  trenches 
arc  undi>"  heavy  shell  tire  and  while  the  curtain  fire  is  used  to 
prevent  reserves  being  brought  up. 

Not  too  many  should  be  placed  in  the  front  line,  but  they 
should  be  echeloned  in  depth  to  confuse  the  enemy  as  to  their 
position  and  in  order  to  obtain  flank  fire  on  any  hostile  parties 
breaking  through  any  part  of  the  line. 

The  value  of  machine  guns  depends  on  the  ability  to  use  them 
suddenly  for  brief  periods  when  the  enemy  presents  a  suitable 
target  and  in  fighting  them  as  long  as  they  can  be  effective,  even 
if  this  results  in  their  capture. 

Every  machine  gun  disposed  for  flanking  fire  must  be  well 
covered  by  grenadiers,  otherwise  the  gunners  will  be  tempted 
to  think  more  of  their  own  defense  and  fire  upon  enemy  groups 
approaching  them,  rather  than  upon  their  designated  objectives. 
This  is  true  to  an  even  greater  extent  with  the  automatic  rifles. 

Those  automatic  rifles  not  used  for  flanking  fire,  the  rifle 
grenades,  and  the  hand  grenades  are  used  to  constitute  bar- 
rages to  keep  back  the  enemy. 

The  entire  front  ought  to  be  defended  by  a.  barrage  of  hand 
grenades,  while  the  barrages  of  the  automatic  rifles  and  the 
rifle  grenades  are  superposed  further  to  the  front,  up  to  about 
-4i><>  yards,  beyond  which  it  is  better  to  form  the  two  with  a 
short  distance  between  them. 

All  the  riflemen  and  those  grenadiers  not  employed  in  forming 
the  barrage  are  reserved  to  make  a  counter  attack  on  the 
enemy. 

The  companies  of  the  second  line  operate  on  similar  prin- 
ciples; the  machine  guns,  automatic  rifles,  and  rifle  grenades 
are  arranged  so  as  to  cover  with  fire  every  portion  of  the  first 
line  which  might  be  invaded  by  the  enemy. 

After  a  short  preparation  by  fire  from  these  the  grenadiers  and 
riflemen  make  the  counter  attack. 

The  captains  in  charge  of  the  two  lines  are  responsible  for 
the  arrangement  of  the  machine  guns,  automatic  rifles,  and 
rifle  grenades,  the  distribution  of  the  barrages,  and  the  distri- 
bution of  the  groups  for  the  counterattack,  the  art  of  which 
to  obtain  the  best  results  while  interfering  as  little  as  possible 
with  the  channels  of  command  in  the  different  sections. 


35 

The  defensive  capacity  of  Infantry,  as  well  as  their  offensive 
power,  have  been  greatly  increased  by  the  introduction  of  the  new 
high-powered  armament,  but  these  weapons  are  valuable  only 
if  they  are  in  the  hands  of  courageous,  well-instructed,  and  dis- 
ciplined soldiers  directed  by  chiefs  having  definite  notions  as 
to  the  use  that  may  be  made  of  them. 

"  In  this  war  the  methods  of  combat  are  being  modified  con- 
tinually ;  it  is  the  duty  of  everyone  to  follow  these  modifications 
and  to  take  advantage  as  early  as  possible  of  the  progress 
accomplished.  Courage  being  equal,  the  victory  is  to  the  most 
skillful." 

The  real  strength  of  the  defense  consists,  not  in  holding  the 
firing  and  cover  trenches,  or  even  the  support  trenches,  but  in 
holding  the  supporting  and  strong  points  until  the  counter- 
attack can  be  launched.  All  arrangements  for  the  counter- 
attack are  made  beforehand  down  to  the  last  detail. 

When  the  enemy's  Artillery  preparation  begins,  the  troops 
leave  the  firing  trenches  and  go  back  to  the  bombproof  covers, 
leaving  only  a  few  men  in  the  observation  positions.  These 
bombproofs  are  placed  along  the  cover  trenches  and  are  pro- 
vided with  at  least  two  entrances  so  as  to  allow  a  prompt  exit 
and  to  provide  against  one  entrance  being  closed  by  an  ex- 
plosion. When  occupied  for  an  extended  period  the  bomb- 
proofs  are  connected  with  each  other  by  underground  passages. 

When  the  fire  of  the  hostile  Artillery  is  raised  to  make  way 
for  the  Infantry  attack  or  to  resort  to  curtain  fire,  the  troops 
return  to  their  firing  trenches,  put  their  machine  guns  in  posi- 
tion, and  break  up  the  attack,  pouring  a  flanking  fire  into  any 
exposed  groups  from  concealed  positions. 

The  Artillery,  while  keeping  up  a  heavy  fire  on  hostile  Artil- 
lery, opens  a  heavy  fire  on  the  Infantry  line  as  soon  as  the 
attack  begins.  The  Artillery  attached  to  the  Infantry  en- 
deavors especially  to  bring  a  fire  to  bear  on  the  hostile  machine 
guns. 

If  the  enemy  succeeds  in  gaining  the  firing  trenches  the 
counterattack  is  launched  before  the  ground  gained  can  be 
consolidated. 

o 


